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I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, “[m]andamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when
the relator shows that the trial court abused its discretion and that no
adequate appellate remedy exists.”1 The Texas Supreme Court recently
stated that “mandamus review is not—and should not be—an easily
wielded tool, but such review of significant rulings in exceptional cases
may be essential to, among other things, ‘spare private parties and the
public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of
* Justice, Fifth District Court of Appeals of Texas. B.S.B.A., Drake University; J.D.,
University of Missouri. Prior to joining the bench, Justice Lang was a partner in the Dallas
office of Gardere Wynne Sewell L.L.P. Justice Lang clerked for the Hon. Fred L. Henley of
the Supreme Court of Missouri from May 1972 to May 1973.
** Staff Attorney, Fifth District Court of Appeals of Texas. B.S., Arizona State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
1. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004)
(orig. proceeding)).
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improperly conducted proceedings.’”2 That statement is consistent with
the supreme court’s past and continuing treatment of mandamus as a limited remedy and further reflects the “heavily circumstantial” nature of
the “benefit-and-detriment analysis” by which its use is to be
determined.3
Although the standard for granting mandamus relief can differ based
on particular circumstances,4 the primary focus of this article is the availability of mandamus relief to correct a clear abuse of discretion by a lower
court when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. During the Survey
period of this article, December 1, 2015, through November 30, 2016, the
Texas Supreme Court delivered opinions in fifteen mandamus cases.5
Fourteen of those fifteen opinions involved requests for relief pursuant to
that standard.6 This article analyzes, summarizes, and categorizes those
fourteen opinions to examine and describe the supreme court’s current
decisional approach.
II. MANDAMUS FUNDAMENTALS
Pursuant to the Texas Government Code, each of the fourteen courts
of appeals of Texas “may issue a writ of mandamus and all other writs
necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court.”7 Also, the courts of
appeals may issue writs of mandamus pertaining to certain district and
county court judges or the performance of election duties.8 The Texas
2. In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 299 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding)
(quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136).
3. See In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d at 304.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 10–11.
5. Those cases are as follows: In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 507 S.W.3d 219 (Tex. 2016) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Heredia, 501 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding); In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Keenan, 501 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V., 494 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re
Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re J.B. Hunt
Transp., 492 S.W.3d at 287; In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d at 300; In re Lazy W
Dist. No. 1, 493 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re Christus Santa Rosa
Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d 621
(Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re M–I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2016)
(orig. proceeding); In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re Bent,
487 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding). Also, in two additional mandamus cases in which no majority
opinion was delivered, individual justices of the supreme court delivered concurring and
dissenting opinions. See In re State of Texas, 489 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding)
(Willett, J., concurring in dismissal of petition for writ of mandamus in a case involving the
right to same-sex marriage); In re C.T., 491 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding)
(Guzman, J., dissenting to denial of petition for writ of mandamus in case involving right of
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services to retain conservatorship following
emergency removal).
6. The remaining case involved mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial
duty of the Texas Comptroller. See In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d at 770–71; see also TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002 (West Supp. 2016); infra text accompanying note 10.
7. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221 (a)–(b) (West 2004).
8. See id.; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (West 2010). In a recent opinion delivered outside the Survey period of this article, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded “courts of appeals in Texs do not have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus
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Supreme Court has mandamus jurisdiction concurrent with the courts of
appeals as to district court judges and election duties.9 Further, the supreme court may issue mandamus as to rulings of the courts of appeals or
to compel the performance of certain judicial, ministerial, or discretionary acts or duties authorized by state law.10 Additionally, in rare instances, Texas statutes specifically provide for mandamus jurisdiction in
cases pertaining to certain matters under those statutes.11
A petition for writ of mandamus is an original appellate proceeding
and is governed procedurally by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.12
If the supreme court and the court of appeals have concurrent jurisdiction, the petition must be presented first to the court of appeals, unless
there is a compelling reason not to do so, which must be stated in the
petition.13 Also, lack of compliance with the remaining requirements of
Rule 52 may result in denial of relief.14
III. MANDAMUS STATISTICS
The supreme court’s consistency in treating mandamus as a remedy of
limited availability is demonstrated by its most recent statistics. During
the supreme court’s 2016 fiscal year, which ran from September 1, 2015,
to August 31, 2016, 188 new petitions for writ of mandamus were filed
with the supreme court.15 Dispositions were made in 194 mandamus
cases.16 The petition for writ of mandamus was denied in 79.8%, or 155,
of those cases.17 In 6.7%, or 13, of those cases, the petition was conditionagainst statutory county courts.” Powell v. Hocker, No. WR-85,177-01, 2017 WL 1244452,
at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2017) (orig. proceeding).
9. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3, 6; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002. Pursuant to Section 22.002(a), the supreme court or a justice of the supreme court may issue writs of
mandamus against “a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state
government except the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of
criminal appeals.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a). According to Powell, 2017 WL
1244452, at *4, mandamus jurisdiction respecting statutory county court judges does not lie
currently in the courts of appeals.
10. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002.
11. See, e.g., In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 617 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding)
(concluding statutory language allowed for supreme court mandamus review of constitutionality of franchise tax statute).
12. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.
13. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e); see also State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 793 (Tex. 2015)
(orig. proceeding).
14. See, e.g., In re Mendez, No. 05-16-01403-CV, 2016 WL 7230395, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Dec. 14, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Marzett, No. 05-16-01319-CV,
2016 WL 7163852, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 22, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In
re Brown, No. 05-14-00169-CV, 2014 WL 1031043, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 26, 2014,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
15. See generally Supreme Court Activity Detail: FY 2016, TEX. COURTS ONLINE, http:/
/www.txcourts.gov/media/1436288/sc-activity-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8C4-9L9G] (last
visited May 5, 2017).
16. Dispositions can include petitions for writ of mandamus filed in the previous fiscal
year and not disposed of during that fiscal year. See id.
17. Id.
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ally granted.18 When compared with statistics for the preceding four
years,19 those numbers show only slight variation:
Table One
Supreme Court Mandamus Statistics: Past Five Fiscal Years
FISCAL YEAR

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

New petitions filed

188

220

219

219

214

Total dispositions20

194

225

216

222

221

Petitions denied

79.8% 72%

81.9% 78.8% 73%

Petitions granted

6.7%

5.5%

7.5%

2.2%

6.3%

As to the fifteen mandamus opinions described above within the Survey period of this article, the petition for writ of mandamus was granted
in fourteen of those fifteen cases and denied in the remaining case.21 In
eight of those fifteen cases, oral arguments were heard by the supreme
court.22 The petition for writ of mandamus was granted in seven of those
eight cases. Also, the petition for writ of mandamus was granted in all
seven cases in which oral arguments were not heard.
IV. SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES OF RECENT TEXAS
SUPREME COURT MANDAMUS CASES INVOLVING
STANDARD OF ALLEGED ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND NO ADEQUATE
REMEDY BY APPEAL
A. DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE
In re H.E.B. Grocery Co.23 required the Texas Supreme Court to consider the propriety of mandamus relief regarding the trial court’s denial
of a defendant’s motion to conduct a physical examination of a plaintiff in
a personal injury case. In that case, Daniel Rodriguez filed a negligence
claim against HEB, alleging that he was injured when he fell in the parking lot of an HEB grocery store. HEB retained Dr. William Swan to give
medical expert testimony. Upon request by opposing counsel, Swan pro18. See id.
19. Id.; see also Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus
Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 261, 265 & n.27 (2016);
Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the
Texas Supreme Court, 1 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 101, 103 n.16 (2014).
20. As described above, dispositions for a particular fiscal year can include petitions
for writ of mandamus filed in the previous fiscal year and not disposed of during that fiscal
year. See supra note 16.
21. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(d), “[w]hen granting relief,
the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.” However, a court is not required to issue an opinion when denying relief. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d).
22. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(b)(4) (stating “court may set the case for oral
argument.”).
23. 492 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
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vided a report stating his opinion about Rodriguez’s injuries. Swan “did
not examine Rodriguez before preparing [that] report,” but rather based
his opinions “solely on a review of Rodriguez’s medical records.”24 Subsequently, “HEB filed a motion requesting that Rodriguez be required to
submit to a physical examination by Dr. Swan,” which was denied by the
trial court.25 Following an unsuccessful attempt to obtain mandamus relief in the court of appeals, HEB petitioned for mandamus in the supreme
court.26
The supreme court observed that pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 204.1, the trial court “may” grant a motion to “obtain a physical or
mental examination of another party . . . if the movant establishes that (1)
‘good cause’ exists for the examination, and (2) the mental or physical
condition of the party the movant seeks to examine ‘is in controversy.’”27
Additionally, “the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a negligence plaintiff
who asserts a mental or physical injury ‘places that . . . injury clearly in
controversy and provides the defendant with good cause for an examination to determine the existence and extent of such asserted injury.’”28
The supreme court concluded that HEB had satisfied the requirements of
Rule 204.1 and therefore the trial court abused its discretion by denying
HEB’s motion for a physical examination.29
Next, the supreme court considered whether there was a “clear and
adequate remedy at law, such as a normal appeal.”30 The supreme court
stated, “The adequacy of an appellate remedy is determined by balancing
the benefits and detriments of mandamus,” a balance that is “heavily circumstantial.”31 Based on its “benefit-and-detriment analysis of the circumstances,” the supreme court concluded HEB lacked an adequate
appellate remedy because (1) “HEB’s defense hinge[d] in large part on
its challenges to the nature, extent, and cause of Rodriguez’s injuries”; (2)
those issues depended “significantly on competing expert testimony”; and
(3) HEB sought “to allow its expert the same opportunity as Rodriguez’s
expert to fully develop and present his opinion, ensuring a fair trial.”32
Accordingly, the supreme court conditionally granted “HEB’s petition
24. Id. at 302.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 303 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 204.1).
28. Id. at 304 (quoting Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 119 (1964)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1984) (orig. proceeding)). It
appears that throughout the past several decades, the supreme court has used the terms
“clear and adequate remedy” and “adequate remedy” interchangeably in describing mandamus requirements. See, e.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840–41 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding) (using both terms without distinction in describing mandamus requirements).
The supreme court has not specifically addressed the definition of “clear” as used in the
term “clear and adequate remedy.” Cf. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,
135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (describing mandamus requirement as “no adequate
remedy by appeal” and discussing how to define “adequate” in that context).
31. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d at 304 (citing In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.,
275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)).
32. Id. at 304–05.
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for writ of mandamus and direct[ed] the trial court to . . . enter an order
requiring Rodriguez to submit to a physical examination on reasonable
and appropriate terms and conditions.”33
In In re DePinho,34 the Texas Supreme Court concluded mandamus
was proper to correct the trial court’s authorization of pre-suit discovery
where the potential claim was unripe. William Bornmann was employed
as the head of a research laboratory at The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center (MD Anderson). “In 2013, Bornmann’s research
team . . . discovered an antibiotic with the potential to treat cancer and
type-2 diabetes.”35 Bornmann signed an “invention disclosure report”
(IDR) presented to him by an employee of MD Anderson, which listed a
number of “contributors,” including Bornmann and the president of MD
Anderson, Ronald DePinho.36 In August 2014, MD Anderson decided
Bornmann’s contract would not be renewed and his lab would be closed.
Shortly before the expiration of his contract, Bornmann filed a petition
pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.1(b)37 seeking to take presuit depositions of DePinho and another high-level employee of MD Anderson, Andrew Dennis (collectively, Relators). In his petition,
“Bornmann theorized that ‘his lab [was being] closed to benefit . . .
DePinho.’”38 Specifically, according to Bornmann, DePinho planned to
subsequently file a “new” IDR without Bornmann’s name and obtain a
patent respecting the antibiotic in question, which would then be licensed
to a company owned by DePinho. Bornmann sought to “investigate a
potential tortious interference claim against Dr. DePinho as well as other
potential causes of action.”39 The trial court granted Bornmann’s request
for Rule 202 depositions of Relators. After an unsuccessful attempt to
obtain mandamus relief in the court of appeals, Relators filed a petition
for writ of mandamus in the supreme court.
The supreme court observed, (1) “Generally, a party ‘cannot obtain by
Rule 202 what it would be denied in the anticipated action’”; and (2)
“allowing courts to authorize Rule 202 depositions for potential suits over
which they lack jurisdiction would untether pre-suit discovery from the
suit it purports to be in aid of.”40 Then, the supreme court addressed
Relators’ argument that Bornmann could not obtain discovery on his potential claims because such claims were “unripe” and therefore not within
33. Id. at 305.
34. 505 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
35. Id. at 622.
36. Id. IDRs are used by the UT System to identify the employee-creators of an invention and their respective contributions for purposes of sharing royalties with the employeecreators. Id. at n.1.
37. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1(b). That rule provides, “A person may petition the court
for an order authorizing the taking of a deposition on oral examination or written questions . . . to investigate a potential claim or suit.” Id.
38. In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d at 622.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 623 (citing In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding)).
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the trial court’s jurisdiction. The supreme court reasoned that all of
Bornmann’s claims “rely upon Bornmann’s theory that DePinho will
soon file a new IDR that prevents Bornmann from sharing in any royalties that might result from his lab’s discovery.”41 Accordingly, the supreme court stated, “[Bornmann’s] claims—all of which rely upon the
same hypothetical patent application—are not yet ripe because the facts
upon which they rely have yet to occur.”42 Therefore, the supreme court
concluded, “[T]he trial court clearly abused its discretion by ordering
Rule 202 depositions and mandamus is proper.”43
In re Christus Santa Rosa Health System44 involved a request for mandamus relief respecting the production of privileged documents. Dr. Gerald Marcus Franklin performed thyroid surgery on Leslie Baird in a
facility operated by Christus Santa Rosa Health System (Christus). That
surgery was unsuccessful and “Christus convened a medical peer review
committee to review Dr. Franklin’s performance in the surgery.”45 Subsequently, Baird filed a malpractice claim against Franklin and his medical
group. “Franklin filed a motion to designate Christus as a responsible
third party, alleging that Christus . . . failed to inform him that . . . a
critical piece of equipment[ would be] unavailable” during the surgery.46
Then, Baird added Christus as a defendant.
Franklin served a “request for production on Christus, asking for,
among other things, documents from Christus’s medical peer review
file.”47 Christus contended those “documents were privileged under the
medical peer review committee privilege” in Section 160.007 of the Texas
Occupations Code.48 Additionally, Christus filed a privilege log listing the
documents withheld based on that privilege. In response, Franklin argued
(1) an exception to the medical peer review privilege applies where “a
medical peer review committee takes action that could result in censure,
suspension, restriction, limitation, revocation, or denial of membership or
privileges in a health care entity”; and (2) that exception is applicable in
this case.49
Upon the filing of a motion to compel by Franklin, “Christus sent the
documents listed in the privilege log to the trial court for an in camera
inspection.”50 Following a hearing, “the trial court ordered Christus to
produce the documents to Dr. Franklin under a protective order [allowing disclosure] only to Dr. Franklin and his attorney.”51 However, the
41. Id. at 625.
42. Id. (citing Camarena v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 754 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)).
43. Id. (citing In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)). The
supreme court did not specifically address the existence of an adequate appellate remedy.
44. 492 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
45. Id. at 278.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(a) (West 2012)).
49. Id. at 281 (quoting TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(d)).
50. Id. at 278.
51. Id. at 279.
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record showed the trial court explained that, during the in camera inspection, Franklin (1) “reviewed the documents only to ‘cull back . . . information regarding other people’s . . . health information and/or [S]ocial
[S]ecurity numbers’”; and (2) “didn’t look at the [peer review] report for
the merits of it one way or the other.”52 Christus sought mandamus relief
in the court of appeals without success, then filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in the supreme court.
The supreme court stated that “the trial court abuses its discretion
when it fails to adequately inspect documents tendered for an in camera
inspection before compelling production ‘when such review is critical to
the evaluation of a privilege claim.’”53 Further, the supreme court stated,
“If the trial court issues an erroneous order requiring the production of
privileged documents, the party claiming the privilege is left without an
adequate appellate remedy.”54 The supreme court stated in part, “We
cannot determine from this record whether the medical peer review committee made a recommendation or final decision required to trigger the
exception under section 160.007(d).”55 The supreme court concluded that
the trial court “clearly abused its discretion in failing to adequately review the merits of the documents to determine whether the privilege applied and, if so, whether the exception in section 160.007(d) was satisfied,
before ordering production.”56 The petition for writ of mandamus was
conditionally granted and the trial court was directed to “vacate the parts
of its . . . order that compel production of the medical peer review committee records at issue here and determine whether, upon further examination, the section 160.007(d) exception to the medical peer review
privilege applies in this case.”57
In re National Lloyds Insurance58 involved the issue of whether a pretrial discovery order was overbroad. The plaintiffs were owners of insurance policies with National Lloyds. Following two hail storms, the
plaintiffs sued National Lloyds alleging underpayment of their insurance
claims. The lawsuit was transferred to a “pretrial court” by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel of Texas. The “[p]laintiffs served National Lloyds
with requests for production” of, among other things, (1) “[a]ll documents regarding the generalized assessment, review, evaluation and/or
summary of [National Lloyds’s] handling of claims arising out of [the hail
storms in question]”; and (2) “[a]ny document general in nature which
applies to more than one claim created, gathered, or reviewed by [Na52. Id. at 282 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 279 (quoting In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex. 2005)
(orig. proceeding)).
54. Id. (citing In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 697–98 (Tex. 2015)
(orig. proceeding); In re Living Ctrs., 175 S.W.3d at 256; Mem’l Hosp.–The Woodlands v.
McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d
833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)).
55. In re Christus, 492 S.W.3d at 285.
56. Id. at 286.
57. Id. at 287.
58. 507 S.W.3d 219 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
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tional Lloyds] relating to [the hail storms in question],” including “any
follow-up documents.”59 “After reviewing emails produced by National
Lloyds, Plaintiffs . . . [moved] to compel production of various . . . systemgenerated management reports referenced in emails,” which plaintiffs
contended were required as a response to their requests for production.60
Additionally, the plaintiffs “sought sanctions against National Lloyds for
its failure to produce the reports.”61 National Lloyds argued, (1) “[T]he
reports sought exceeded the scope of the prior requests for production”;
and (2) discovery as to those reports was “overbroad” and in violation of
a prior case involving National Lloyds in which the supreme court held
that a “trial court had abused its discretion in ordering a defendant insurer to produce evidence related to insurance claims other than the
plaintiff’s claim.”62 The pretrial court signed an order that read: “Management Reports and Emails—National Lloyds is ordered to produce all
emails, reports attached to emails, and any follow-up correspondence and
information related to those reports which were sent or received by a
National Lloyds employee or any affiliated adjusting company employees.”63 Additionally, the order required National Lloyds to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees as sanctions. The court of appeals denied National
Lloyds’s request for mandamus relief as to the portions of that order described above, and National Lloyds then petitioned for mandamus relief
in the supreme court.
The supreme court stated, “A discovery order that compels production
beyond the rules of procedure is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy.”64 Then, the supreme court observed that the
discovery order in question “is not limited by location or weather event
and exceeds the scope of [the plaintiffs’] requests for production.”65 Further, the supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the breadth
of the discovery order was proper (1) in light of the fact that the case is
“an MDL case” involving “large-scale discovery”; or (2) because plaintiffs were seeking to show National Lloyds “had knowledge of its own
misdeeds and a pattern and practice to defraud its insureds.”66 The supreme court concluded that because the discovery order “was not tailored with regard to time, place, or subject matter,” it was overbroad and
mandamus relief was warranted.67 Additionally, as to the sanctions
awarded against National Lloyds, the supreme court stated that the pretrial court “is better situated to determine whether the attorney’s fees
award remains appropriate in light of the Court’s decision today” and
59. Id. at 221.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 222.
62. Id.; see In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 449 S.W.3d 486, 488–90 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding).
63. In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 507 S.W.3d at 222.
64. Id. at 223 (quoting In re Nat’l Lloyds, 449 S.W.3d at 488).
65. Id. at 225.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 226.
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directed the pretrial court to “reevaluate the ordered sanctions.”68
In In re Keenan,69 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a trial
court’s restrictions respecting evidence in a homeowner’s challenge to the
actions of a homeowners’ association warranted mandamus relief.
Carolyn Frost Keenan owned a home that was subject to deed restrictions
enforced by River Oaks Property Owners, Inc. (ROPO), a homeowners’
association. In 2014, ROPO filed a lawsuit against Keenan in which it
sought to require “Keenan to remove improvements that allegedly violated a limit on impervious cover . . . found in 2006 ‘Amended Restrictions’ that purported to amend the neighborhood’s deed restrictions.”70
Keenan filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration “that the Amended
Restrictions were ‘not properly enacted’ and were ‘unenforceable’ [because] an insufficient number of homeowners had voted for the
Amended Restrictions.”71 Also, “Keenan served a discovery request for
production of the homeowner ballots on the 2006 Amended Restrictions.”72 Upon ROPO’s objection “that the ballots were confidential and
privileged voting records and were irrelevant to the dispute[,] Keenan
moved to compel production.”73 The trial court signed an order that
granted Keenan access to the ballots but also provided that (1) “only
Keenan’s counsel could review the ballots”; (2) “Keenan could not copy
the ballots”; and (3) “the contents of the ballots could not be disclosed ‘to
anyone else’ without further court order.”74 After inspecting the ballots,
Keenan’s counsel “made clear his belief . . . that ROPO had received
insufficient votes to approve the Amended Restrictions” and asked that
the trial court’s order be modified to remove the restrictions on access to
the ballots.75 At a hearing on that request, the trial court declined to order production of the ballots but stated orally that (1) “it might let Keenan subpoena them at trial”; and (2) “counsel could share his notes on
the ballots with Keenan’s expert.”76
The court of appeals denied Keenan’s request for mandamus relief that
would allow review of the ballots by Keenan’s expert. Then, Keenan filed
a petition for mandamus relief in the supreme court. The supreme court
observed that in determining whether a relator has an adequate remedy
by appeal, the court “may consider whether mandamus can spare the litigants and public ‘the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual
reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’”77 Additionally, the supreme court stated, “[A] key issue is whether ROPO obtained sufficient
68. Id.
69. 501 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
70. Id. at 75.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 76.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004)
(orig. proceeding)).
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votes to enact the 2006 Amended Restrictions,” and “Keenan is entitled
to challenge the sufficiency of the votes.”78 The supreme court reasoned
that “[t]he outcome of the dispute should not turn, unnecessarily, on the
credibility of a party’s attorney”; but rather, “Keenan’s expert should be
able to review directly the ballots and testify as to whether a vote threshold . . . was achieved.”79 Further, as to an argument by ROPO “that votes
cast in an election are traditionally treated as confidential,” the supreme
court stated the trial court is not foreclosed from “entering an appropriate protective order.”80 The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to “permit Keenan to copy the
ballots and disclose them for purposes of discovery, expert analysis, trial
preparation, and trial.”81
In the case of In re City of Dallas,82 the Texas Supreme Court concluded an issue affecting whether jurisdiction existed that required the
supreme court’s sua sponte review before it could address the merits of
the case. The City of Corsicana, Navarro County, and Navarro College
(collectively, Navarro) filed a petition pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 202 in the county court at law seeking authorization for presuit depositions “to investigate a potential tortious interference claim
against the City of Dallas” (Dallas).83 In its petition, Navarro alleged
Dallas’s tortious interference caused Navarro County to lose “approximately 200 jobs that were formally located within Navarro County.”84
Although “Navarro did not specify the damages it would seek in the anticipated suit,” it stated that it was injured because (1) “jobs are no longer
located in Navarro County where Navarro County taxing authorities and
businesses can benefit” from them; and (2) “the loss of unabated tax revenues on the real property and inventory has . . . caused significant injury.”85 Dallas filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental
immunity, which the county court at law denied. Further, the county
court at law granted Navarro’s Rule 202 petition and authorized the requested pre-suit depositions. The court of appeals granted Dallas’s request for mandamus relief in part, narrowing the scope of the county
court at law’s Rule 202 order.86 Then, Dallas sought mandamus relief in
the supreme court.
The supreme court observed, (1) “[F]or a party to properly obtain Rule
202 pre-suit discovery, ‘the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction
78. Id.
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 78.
82. 501 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
83. Id. at 73; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 202 (titled “Depositions Before Suit or to Investigate
Claims”).
84. In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d at 74.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 73 (citing City of Dallas v. City of Corsicana, No. 10-14-00090-CV, 2015 WL
4985935, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 20, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) mand. conditionally granted sub. nom. In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d 71).

276

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 3

over the anticipated action’”;87 (2) “a court is duty-bound to determine
its jurisdiction regardless of whether the parties have questioned it”;88 (3)
“[c]ounty courts at law are courts of limited jurisdiction and many, including the county court at law in this case, lack jurisdiction over a ‘matter in controversy’ that exceeds $[2]00,000”;89 and (4) the record showed
the county court at law asked counsel for Navarro, “In regards to damages, do y’all fall under the jurisdiction of my court?” and Navarro’s
counsel responded, “Well, we wouldn’t if . . . we were here litigating the
lawsuit,” but “[t]he only thing we’re asking for is discovery.”90 The supreme court concluded it could not say “with certainty that the amount in
controversy of Navarro’s potential claim exceed[ed] $200,000.”91 Consequently, the supreme court conditionally granted the petition for writ of
mandamus and directed the county court at law “to vacate its order authorizing depositions and to first determine its jurisdiction.”92
In In re M–I L.L.C.,93 the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether the
trial court acted properly regarding the protection of alleged trade
secrets. Jeff Russo was employed by M–I as the business development
manager of a division that sold mesh screens used in oil and gas drilling.
After several years in that position, Russo left M–I and became the
global product line manager of the screen division of a competitor, NOV.
M–I sent a letter to Russo stating that he retained trade secrets and confidential information. The letter also asserted that Russo was in breach of a
non-compete agreement with M–I.94 Russo sued M–I, requesting a declaration that his non-compete agreement with M–I was unenforceable. M–I
(1) filed counterclaims against Russo for, among other things, breach of
the non-compete agreement and misappropriation of trade secrets; and
(2) “asserted third-party claims against NOV for misappropriation of
trade secrets and tortious interference.”95 The relief sought by M–I included a temporary injunction. At the hearing on M–I’s application for a
temporary injunction, M–I sought to present the testimony of the global
business line manager of its screen division, LaTosha Moore, in order to
establish its trade secrets. “M–I requested that everyone, except the parties’ counsel, their experts, and Russo be excluded from the courtroom”
during M–I’s presentation of that testimony.96 The trial court denied that
request on the ground that excluding NOV’s designated representative
87. Id. at 73 (quoting In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2016) (per curium)
(orig. proceeding)).
88. Id. (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358 (Tex.
2004), superceded by statute, Act of May 25, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1150, § 1, 2005 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3783, 3783, as recognized in Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d
500 (Tex. 2012)).
89. Id. (quoting United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Brite, 215 S.W.3d 400, 401 (Tex. 2007)).
90. Id. at 74.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 505 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
94. Id. at 573.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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would be “a total violation of due process.”97 However, the trial court
stated it would order NOV’s designated representative not to disclose or
use any trade secrets he heard. M–I requested, and was granted, a recess
in order to pursue mandamus relief in the court of appeals. M–I consulted the court of appeals in camera, and “[a]s an offer of proof, [ ] submitted . . . an affidavit from Moore detailing the testimony she was
prepared to offer at the temporary injunction hearing.”98 The court of
appeals denied mandamus relief.99 Immediately thereafter, Russo and
NOV filed a motion requesting the trial court to compel production of
the Moore affidavit submitted by M–I to the court of appeals, contending
“it was a discoverable witness statement.”100 The trial court granted that
motion without reviewing the Moore affidavit. Then, M–I sought mandamus relief in the supreme court.
The supreme court stated there was “no dispute” that the mandamus
requirement of no adequate appellate remedy was satisfied because “no
adequate appellate remedy exists for an erroneous order to disclose a
trade secret.”101 Further, the supreme court stated, (1) “[C]ourts have
discretion to exclude parties and their representatives in limited circumstances when countervailing interests overcome [the] presumption” in
favor of participation, and (2) “[i]n the present case, this balancing required the trial court to determine the degree of competitive harm M–I
would have suffered from the dissemination of its alleged trade secrets to
[NOV’s designated representative].”102 The supreme court reasoned that
“[w]ithout knowing what M–I’s alleged trade secrets were, the trial court
simply could not have conducted the required balancing.”103 Additionally, the supreme court reasoned that “[b]ecause the Moore affidavit itself was the only evidence that could substantiate whether it did, in fact,
contain trade secrets, the trial court had no choice but to review it in
camera before ruling on whether to produce it over M–I’s assertion that it
contained trade secrets.”104 The supreme court concluded the trial court
abused its discretion by (1) not properly balancing the competing interests at stake before making its determination as to whether NOV’s designated representative should be excluded from the preliminary injunction
97. Id. at 574.
98. Id. at 573.
99. In re M–I L.L.C., No. 14–14–00705–CV, 2014 WL 5591575, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 4, 2014, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.), mand. conditionally granted 505 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
100. In re M–I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d at 573.
101. Id. at 574 (citing In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. 1998) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
102. Id. at 575–76 (first citing Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., a Div. of Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 766 F.2d 208, 217 (6th Cir. 1985); and then citing Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343,
348 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (“requiring court to consider harm to party’s proprietary
interest before restricting dissemination of trade secrets”)).
103. Id. at 576.
104. Id. at 579 (citing Weisel Enters., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1986) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding) (“recognizing that, when allegedly privileged documents are the
only evidence to substantiate the claim of privilege, the trial court must review them in
camera”)).
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hearing; and (2) ordering the Moore affidavit disclosed without reviewing
it in camera.105 Consequently, the supreme court conditionally granted
mandamus relief.106
B. LAWSUIT FORUM
In re Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V.107 involved the issue of whether the
trial court properly applied the relevant factors in denying a motion to
dismiss based on forum non conveniens. A merchant vessel operated by
Oceanografia, a Mexican entity, sank off the coast of Mexico as it was
ferrying Mexican workers to an offshore drilling site, resulting in the
drowning of one of its workers.108 The vessel’s owner was a Mexican entity controlled by a Louisiana entity. A Texas entity, OSA International,
LLC, was Oceanografia’s marketing affiliate.
In 2008, Oceanografia, OSA, the vessel’s owner, and the owner’s Louisiana affiliate (collectively, defendants) were sued in Texas by the deceased’s beneficiaries and ninety-one of the surviving workers, all of
whom lived in Mexico, except one. The three non-Texas defendants
moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on forum non conveniens, pursuant to
Section 71.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.109 The
trial court denied both that motion and a special appearance filed by
Oceanografia. During approximately the next six years, Oceanographia
unsuccessfully appealed the denial of its special appearance, engaged in
discovery, and participated in attempts at mediation. Then, “[i]n June
2014, defendants sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals,”110
regarding the denial of the above-described motion to dismiss. The court
of appeals denied that relief, “concluding that defendants’ lack of diligence in pursuing relief had prejudiced plaintiffs.”111 Ultimately, defendants sought mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court.
First, the supreme court concluded defendants’ delay in seeking mandamus relief from the denial of the motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens was not unreasonable because (1) “to press ahead might have
compromised [Oceanografia’s] appeal of the denial of its special appearance”; and (2) plaintiffs showed no prejudice from the delay.112 Second,
the supreme court addressed the six factors listed in Section 71.051(b)
respecting dismissal for forum non conveniens:
(1) [A]n alternate forum exists in which the claim or action may be
tried; (2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy; (3)
maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state would
105. Id. at 580.
106. Id.
107. 494 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
108. Id. at 730.
109. See id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West Supp. 2016)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 731 (citing In re E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 92 S.W.3d 517, 524–25 (Tex.
2002) (orig. proceeding)).
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work a substantial injustice to the moving party; (4) the alternate
forum, as a result of the submission of the parties or otherwise, can
exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants properly joined to the
plaintiff’s claim; (5) the balance of the private interests of the parties
and the public interest of the state predominate in favor of the claim
or action being brought in an alternate forum, which shall include
consideration of the extent to which an injury or death resulted from
acts or omissions that occurred in this state; and (6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplication or proliferation
of litigation.113
The supreme court concluded, (1) “The first, fourth, and sixth factors
clearly weigh in favor of dismissal”; and (2) the evidence did not support
findings that Mexican courts would not provide an adequate remedy;
“that maintaining this action in Texas[, as compared to Mexico,] would
not work a substantial injustice”; or that the balance of the relevant interests predominated in favor of maintaining the action in Texas.114 The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial
court to issue an order dismissing the case for forum non conveniens.115
In In re Nationwide Insurance Co. of America,116 the Texas Supreme
Court considered the propriety of the trial court’s denial to enforce a
contractual forum-selection clause. In December 2012, a former independent agent of Nationwide named Brian Besch filed a lawsuit in Texas
against several Nationwide affiliates for breach of contract, fraud, and
occupational disparagement. The contract sued upon contained a clause
identifying Franklin County, Ohio, as the proper forum for a dispute respecting the matter to which the lawsuit pertained. In January 2015, Nationwide sought to enforce the forum-selection clause by moving to
dismiss the Texas lawsuit. Besch argued that (1) Nationwide had waived
the clause by “its substantial participation in the Texas litigation coupled
with the delay in asserting its rights”; and (2) such “participation and delay was prejudicial because [Besch’s] contract claim” was now barred in
Ohio pursuant to a limitations period contained in the contract and enforceable under Ohio law.117 Although “Nationwide [then] agreed to
waive enforcement of the contractual-limitations clause[, the] trial court
. . . rejected [that] waiver as ‘untimely’ and denied [Nationwide’s] motion
to dismiss.”118 After mandamus relief was denied by the court of appeals,
Nationwide sought mandamus relief in the supreme court.
The supreme court observed that a trial court abuses its discretion by
refusing to enforce a contractual forum-selection clause “absent clear evidence that ‘(1) enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, (2) the
clause is invalid for reasons of fraud or overreaching, (3) enforcement
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 731–32 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b)).
Id. at 732–33.
Id. at 733.
494 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
Id. at 711.
Id. at 712.
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would contravene a strong public policy of the forum where the suit was
brought, or (4) the selected forum would be seriously inconvenient for
trial.’”119 The supreme court added, “[W]e have repeatedly held that appeal is inadequate to remedy the erroneous denial of such a motion.”120
Further, the supreme court noted it is ordinarily “unreasonable or unjust”
for a court to enforce a forum-selection clause if that clause has been
waived.121 Then, the supreme court turned to the applicable test for determining waiver in forum-selection clause cases, which “embodies aspects of estoppel” and requires consideration of whether a party has
“substantially invoke[ed] the judicial process to the other party’s detriment or prejudice.”122 The supreme court rejected Besch’s argument that
“Nationwide’s delay [was] prejudicial because Nationwide’s assertion of
its right under the forum-selection clause came after the expiration of the
contractual-limitations period.”123 Rather, the supreme court concluded
that, even assuming Nationwide’s conduct substantially invoked the judicial process, Besch “never actually suffered the prejudice of which he
complains” and “[t]he assumed loss of his contract claim, once theoretical, does not exist because of Nationwide’s voluntary waiver of the contractual-limitations period.”124 The supreme court conditionally granted
mandamus relief and “direct[ed] the trial court to enforce the parties’
[contractual] forum-selection clause.”125
C. MOTION

FOR

NEW TRIAL

In re Bent126 concerned the propriety of the trial court’s order granting
a motion for new trial, an issue involving application of requirements
119. Id. (quoting In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 231–32 (Tex. 2008) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
120. Id. (citing, inter alia, In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex. 2010)
(per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 713 (quoting In re ADM Inv’r Servs., Inc., 304 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2010)
(orig. proceeding)). The supreme court noted: (1) “Besch concedes that the ‘time, effort,
and funds’ he expended in the Texas litigation are not the type of detriment ‘typically . . .
deemed [ ]sufficient by Texas courts to avoid a forum-selection clause”; and (2)
“[m]oreover, delay alone is generally insufficient to establish waiver.” Id. at 713–14 (first
citing Automated Collection Techs., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 557, 559–60 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding); and then citing In re Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.
2006) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
123. Id. at 714.
124. Id. Additionally, the supreme court rejected Besch’s argument that he would “be
prejudiced if the forum-selection clause [was] enforced because his fraud claim was also
barred by limitations in Ohio.” Id. The supreme court reasoned that, unlike Besch’s breach
of contract claim, his fraud claim “did not become barred until several months after Nationwide asserted its rights under the mandatory forum-selection clause,” and therefore
“Besch had a reasonable opportunity to preserve [that] claim in Ohio.” Id. at 714–15.
125. Id. at 717. A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Guzman, in which Justice
Brown joined. Id. The dissent argued in part that Besch’s contract claim was “potentially
prejudice[d] because there [was] no proof Nationwide would honor its waiver of the contractual-limitations clause.” Id. at 716, 721 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
126. 487 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
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shaped by the Texas Supreme Court in recent years.127 Stacey and Mark
Bent purchased a home in 2005 and secured homeowner’s insurance with
USAA. After incurring damage to their home from a hurricane and
flooding, the Bents filed several insurance claims and eventually sued
USAA for breach of their homeowner’s policy and various violations of
the Texas Insurance Code. While that litigation was proceeding, the Bents
met with city officials respecting city restrictions on their efforts to repair
their house and were informed that an ordinance required the home to be
rebuilt at least one foot above the flood plain in which it sat.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found USAA did not breach the
homeowner’s policy, but did make a misleading statement in violation of
the insurance code respecting whether the policy covered tree removal.
The jury awarded the Bents damages of $150,000 for the diminished value
of the home, $250,000 for mental anguish, and $185,000 in attorney’s fees
through trial. The Bents filed a motion for new trial, which was granted
by the trial court. In its order, the trial court provided five bases:
(1) [T]he jury’s finding that USAA did not breach the homeowner’s
policy was contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence; (2) USAA violated the trial court’s order in limine regarding the Bents’ failure to seek a variance from the relevant . . . city
ordinance; (3) the evidence did not support the jury’s award for the
diminished value of the Bents’ home; (4) the jury improperly failed
to award appellate attorney’s fees; and (5) the jury’s finding as to
mental-anguish damages was not supported by a finding that USAA
“knowingly” violated the Insurance Code, a predicate for which both
sides failed to argue.128
The court of appeals granted USAA’s request for mandamus relief,
concluding the trial court abused its discretion on each of its bases for
granting a new trial. Then, the Bents sought mandamus relief in the supreme court, contending “the trial court acted within its discretion on
every basis except for the mental-anguish-damages predicate,” which
they did not present for review.129
The supreme court observed that it had held in other mandamus cases
involving motions for new trial that “‘the significance of the issue—protection of the right to jury trial’—justified mandamus review under the
circumstances.”130 Also, the supreme court stated that
a trial court does not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial “so
long as its stated reason for granting a new trial (1) is a reason for
which a new trial is legally appropriate (such as a well-defined legal
127. See id. at 173 (citing In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 748–49
(Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex.
2012) (orig. proceeding); In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290
S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)). According to the supreme court, “Within
the past decade, this Court’s jurisprudence has evolved to more firmly secure Texans’ constitutional right to a jury trial in the new-trial context.” Id. at 175.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 176 (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209).
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standard or a defect that probably resulted in an improper verdict);
and (2) is specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma template, but rather derived the articulated
reasons from the particular facts and circumstances of the case at
hand.”131
Further, the supreme court noted it had held that “‘[a]ppellate courts
must be able to conduct merits-based review of new[-]trial orders’ and if
‘a trial court’s articulated reasons are not supported by the underlying
record, the new[-]trial order cannot stand.’”132
The trial court’s first basis for granting a new trial, that “the jury’s finding that USAA did not breach the Bents’ homeowner’s policy[, was] ‘so
contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence . . . as to
be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust,’” was found by the supreme court
to turn on the prompt-payment provision in the policy.133 However, the
supreme court stated that the trial court’s explanation did not meet the
applicable “facial requirements” because (1) “the trial court never
pinpoint[ed] the events or dates it believed triggered USAA’s promptpayment obligation”; and (2) “its explanation serves only to suggest the
trial court failed to properly ascertain the nature of that provision.”134 As
to the second basis, the supreme court stated that the record showed the
disputed order in limine “only limited questions as to whether the Bents
would have received a variance if they applied for one,” and USAA did
not violate that particular restriction.135 As to the third basis, the supreme court observed that while the trial court’s order “discusses the parties’ arguments as to what the evidence showed,” that order “makes no
reference to the evidence at all,” but rather, “offers only the conclusory
comment that the jury’s award ‘seems arbitrary.’”136 Therefore, the supreme court concluded, the trial court’s third basis did not meet the applicable standard.137 Finally, as to the fourth basis, the supreme court stated,
(1) “[A]bsent any reference to what evidence was adduced as to reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, the failure to award attorney’s fees
under a mandatory-fee statute is not in itself a reason for which a new
trial is legally appropriate”; and (2) although the trial court’s order in
question stated that “evidence supporting an award of reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees is ‘overwhelming,’” that basis was “facially insufficient” because it did not “indicate that the trial judge considered the
131. Id. (quoting In re United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 688–89).
132. Id. at 177 (quoting In re Toyota, 407 S.W.3d at 758). The supreme court explained
that In re Toyota did not create a new standard of review and “the abuse-of-discretion
standard applies to merits review just as it does in all mandamus proceedings.” Id. at 178.
Also, the supreme court noted the case before it did not require it to engage the question
of “‘[h]ow exacting can or should an appellate court’s review be when there is no direct
conflict’ between the record and the stated bases for a new trial.” Id. at 177.
133. Id. at 178.
134. Id. at 179.
135. Id. at 182.
136. Id. at 183.
137. Id.
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specific facts and circumstances of the case at hand and explain how the
evidence (or lack of evidence) undermines the jury’s findings.”138 The
supreme court concluded that because the trial court abused its discretion
as to all four of the challenged bases, “the court of appeals acted appropriately in conditionally granting mandamus relief directing the trial court
to vacate its order and enter judgment on the jury’s verdict.”139
D. DISQUALIFICATION

OF

COUNSEL

In re RSR Corp.140 involved the issue of whether the trial court improperly disqualified a party’s counsel who was privy to documents supplied by a former finance manager of the opposing party. The law firm of
Bickel & Brewer represented RSR in a lawsuit filed in 2008 against Inppamet S.A., a Chilean manufacturer of mining products, for breach of
contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. While that lawsuit was
pending, Inppamet sued RSR in Chile. RSR’s counsel in the Chilean litigation was the law firm of Bofill Mir & Alvarez Jana (BMAJ).
In April 2010, Inppamet’s finance manager, Hernan Sobarzo, resigned
and took with him approximately 2.3 gigabytes of data, including emails
and other documents. Several months later, BMAJ retained Sobarzo as a
consultant and paid him to meet with its attorneys numerous times to
discuss Inppamat and its payments to RSR under the contract in dispute.
Attorneys and consultants from Bickel & Brewer were often present at
those meetings and viewed documents provided by Sobarzo.
“Inppamet moved to disqualify Bickel & Brewer from representing
RSR.”141 The trial court granted that motion, relying primarily on In re
American Home Products Corp.,142 a Texas Supreme Court case addressing “disqualification of counsel for hiring the other side’s former paralegal or legal assistant.”143 The court of appeals denied RSR’s petition for
writ of mandamus, and RSR then sought mandamus relief in the supreme
court.
The supreme court stated, “A party whose counsel is improperly disqualified has no adequate remedy by appeal,” and, therefore, mandamus
relief was appropriate “if the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying Bickel & Brewer.”144 Additionally, the supreme court observed,
138. Id. at 184 (citing In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Tex. 2012)
(orig. proceeding)).
139. Id. The supreme court did not specifically address the adequacy of an appellate
remedy, but, as described above, repeatedly cited In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,
Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209–10 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding), in which it discussed the adequacy of an appellate remedy in the motion for new trial context. See id. at
173–74, 176.
140. 475 S.W.3d 775 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding).
141. Id. at 778.
142. 985 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
143. In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d at 778.
144. Id. (first citing In re Guar. Ins. Servs., Inc., 343 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. 2011) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding); and then citing In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422
(Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
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“[W]e may not make factual determinations in mandamus proceedings.”145 Then, the supreme court addressed RSR’s position that because
Sobarzo was a fact witness, the standard in American Home Products was
inapplicable. That court concluded, (1) “[T]he American Home Products
screening requirement does not govern a fact witness with information
about his former employer if his position with that employer existed independently of litigation and he did not primarily report to lawyers”; and
(2) “[t]o the extent the fact witness discloses his past employer’s privileged and confidential information, the factors outlined by In re Meador
. . . should guide the trial court’s discretion regarding disqualification.”146
Further, the supreme court stated that although the trial court abused its
discretion by applying the wrong standard, it need not “decide whether
disqualification would have been proper under Meador because the trial
court did not reach the issue and did not resolve all fact issues relevant to
a Meador analysis.”147 The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief, stating, “The writ will issue only if the trial court does not
vacate its order granting Inppamet’s motion to disqualify.”148
E. JURISDICTION/“AUTHORITY”
In the case of In re J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.,149 the Texas Supreme
Court was faced with multiple questions respecting dominant jurisdiction,
including determination of the legal standard governing the availability of
mandamus relief regarding denial of a plea in abatement. A tractortrailer owned by J.B. Hunt Transport struck a disabled Isuzu vehicle that
had entered the truck’s traffic lane, resulting in injuries to the Isuzu’s
occupants. J.B. Hunt Transport filed a lawsuit in Waller County, Texas, to
recover for damage to its property. Ten days later, the Isuzu’s occupants
(the Real Parties) filed a personal injury lawsuit against J.B. Hunt Transport in Dallas County. Both sides filed dueling pleas in abatement, asserting dominant jurisdiction in the respective courts in which they had filed
their lawsuits. The arguments made by the Real Parties included the following: (1) “[N]o dominant-jurisdiction question [existed] because the
two suits [were] not inherently interrelated [pursuant to the standard described in Texas Supreme Court case law]; (2) J.B. Hunt did not have a
bona fide intent to prosecute the Waller County suit,” but rather “intended to secure a favorable venue to defend a significant personal-injury
case”; and “(3) J.B. Hunt engaged in inequitable conduct” preventing the
Real Parties from filing their suit more promptly, and J.B. Hunt was
145. Id. (citing In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 648 (Tex.
2009) (orig. proceeding)).
146. Id. at 776 (citing In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding)).
Additionally, the supreme court disapproved of a court of appeals decision relied upon by
Inppamet (In re Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 139, 144 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, orig. proceeding [mand. denied])) “for disqualifying a firm that hired the opposing
side’s former engineer without first considering the Meador factors.” Id. at 782.
147. Id. at 782.
148. Id.
149. 492 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
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therefore estopped from claiming dominant jurisdiction in Waller
County.150 Following a hearing, the Dallas County court concluded exceptions to the first-filed rule applied and therefore it, rather than the
Waller County court, had dominant jurisdiction.151 J.B. Hunt Transport
unsuccessfully sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals, then filed
a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme court.
The supreme court noted, in part, (1) “The general common law rule in
Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts”;152 and (2) “[a]s a
result, when two suits are inherently interrelated, ‘a plea in abatement in
the second action must be granted.’”153 As to whether the required inherent interrelationship existed, the supreme court observed it had previously established courts should be guided by the compulsory
counterclaim rule in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 97(a).154 However,
the supreme court stated it had mischaracterized that rule in the language
of a prior case upon which the Real Parties’ argument was based.155 The
supreme court clarified that, notwithstanding its language used in several
previous cases, “a counterclaim is compulsory if, in addition to Rule
97(a)’s other requirements, it was not the subject of a pending action
when the original suit was commenced.”156 Then, the supreme court
noted that the parties did not dispute that this requirement, as properly
characterized, had been met.
Next, the supreme court considered whether the trial court had abused
its discretion respecting exceptions to the first-filed rule. As to alleged
inequitable conduct by J.B. Hunt Transport, the supreme court stated
that, even assuming J.B. Hunt Transport’s conduct was inequitable, the
Real Parties had “fatally failed to allege that the conduct caused their
delay, if any, in filing suit.”157 Further, as to J.B. Hunt Transport’s bona
fide intention to prosecute its lawsuit, the supreme court stated the record showed “quintessential acts of prosecuting a suit” by J.B. Hunt
Transport.158 The supreme court concluded “the trial court abused its discretion in not granting J.B. Hunt’s plea in abatement.”159
Finally, the supreme court addressed the proper legal standard for
mandamus review of erroneously denied pleas in abatement in dominant150. Id. at 291, 296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. at 289.
152. Id. at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d
263, 267 (Tex. 1974) (orig. proceeding)).
153. Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 1988) (orig.
proceeding)).
154. Id. at 292 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 97(a)).
155. Id. (citing with disapproval Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247).
156. Id. at 293.
157. Id. at 295.
158. Id. at 296. Those acts included J.B. Hunt Transport’s “attempting to obtain waivers
of personal service and threatening to obtain a TRO in the court in which [it had] sued.”
Id.
159. Id. at 298.
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jurisdiction cases.160 The supreme court observed that in Abor v.
Black,161 it concluded “mandamus relief is unavailable to correct an erroneous denial of a plea in abatement where there is ‘no conflict of jurisdiction’—that is, there was no injunction or order in one court ‘which
actively interferes with the exercise of jurisdiction’ in the other court.”162
However, the supreme court “revisited the contours of mandamus relief”
more recently in In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America and “reaffirmed that entitlement to mandamus relief requires the relator to establish both (1) a trial court’s abuse of discretion, and (2) no adequate
remedy by appeal.”163 Further, the supreme court stated that “adequate”
is “a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that
determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings
to review the actions of lower courts.”164 The supreme court observed,
“Many Texas courts of appeals have split on the question of whether Prudential abrogates Abor and permits more flexible mandamus review of
erroneously denied pleas in abatement in dominant-jurisdiction cases.”165
Then, the supreme court stated:
We now hold that Prudential indeed abrogates Abor’s inflexible understanding of an adequate remedy by appeal. Permitting a case to
proceed in the wrong court necessarily costs “private parties and the
public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal
of improperly conducted proceedings.” That was often the vice of
Abor’s strict standard. But Prudential’s virtue is that it spares private
parties and the public those costs. Abor is therefore at odds with
Prudential and no longer provides the governing standard for an adequate remedy by appeal. Therefore, a relator need only establish a
trial court’s abuse of discretion to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief with regard to a plea in abatement in a dominant-jurisdiction case.166
The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed
the trial court to grant J.B. Hunt Transport’s plea in abatement.167
In re Lazy W District No. 1168 arose from a trial court’s refusal to appoint special commissioners in a condemnation action involving two governmental entities. The Tarrant Regional Water District (the Water
District) petitioned for condemnation of a water pipeline easement across
land owned by Lazy W District No. 1 (Lazy W), a municipal utility district. Pursuant to Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code, which governs
160. Id.
161. 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), abrogated by In re J.B. Hunt, 492
S.W.3d 287.
162. In re J.B. Hunt Transp., 492 S.W.3d at 298 (quoting Abor, 695 S.W.2d at 567).
163. Id. at 299 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding)).
164. Id. (quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 299–300 (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136).
167. Id. at 300.
168. 493 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
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the exercise of eminent domain authority, the trial court “appointed three
special commissioners to determine the value of the proposed easement.”169 Before any hearing was held by the commissioners, Lazy W
filed “a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting its immunity as a governmental
entity and requesting that the appointments be vacated and the petition
dismissed.”170 The trial court vacated the appointments and “issued an
order declining to appoint special commissioners before hearing and ruling on the Lazy W’s plea.”171 The Water District successfully obtained
mandamus relief in the court of appeals, which concluded that (1) “the
trial court was without jurisdiction to refuse to appoint special commissioners”; (2) “Lazy W’s plea of [governmental] immunity was premature”; and (3) “the trial court’s only course was to ignore the plea until
after an objection to the commissioners’ award.”172 The trial court was
directed by the court of appeals “to appoint special commissioners and
allow them to proceed.”173 Then, Lazy W sought mandamus relief in the
Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court observed that condemnation proceedings pursuant
to Chapter 21 have two parts. “The first part, involving the commissioners, . . . is essentially an official, compulsory mediation of the value dispute with the goal of avoiding a trial” and has been characterized as
“administrative.”174 According to the supreme court, “[T]rial courts lack
jurisdiction to interfere with proceedings pending before the commissioners.”175 The second part, which follows a proper objection to the commissioners’ award, is “judicial,” and the trial court “has jurisdiction to
proceed as in any other case.”176 However, the supreme court stated, (1)
“Courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction”; (2)
“[t]he Property Code does not limit the trial court’s power or responsibility to determine its jurisdiction”; and (3) “the special commissioners’ proceeding should not be a probable waste of time and effort.”177 The
supreme court concluded, “The trial court had the obligation to consider
the Lazy W’s assertion of immunity when the plea to the jurisdiction was
filed” and therefore “did not abuse its discretion in determining to do
so.”178 Consequently, the court of appeals abused its discretion in grant169. Id. at 540, 542 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.103 (West 2014)).
170. Id. at 541 (footnote omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 542 (citing Amason v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Tex.
1984); Pearson v. State, 315 S.W.2d 935, 936–37 (Tex. 1958)).
175. Id. (citing Ex parte Edmonds, 383 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Tex. 1964) (orig. proceeding);
State v. Giles (368 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Tex. 1963) (orig. proceeding)).
176. Id. at 542–43 (first citing Amason, 682 S.W.2d at 241; and then citing John v. State,
826 S.W.2d 138, 141 n.5 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam); Pearson, 315 S.W.2d at 937).
177. Id. at 544 (quoting Hous. Mun. Emps.’ Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158
(Tex. 2007)).
178. Id.
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ing mandamus relief.179
In re Heredia180 involved an untimely challenge to an affidavit of indigence. Norma Heredia filed a personal injury claim against a retail store
based on a slip-and-fall incident. The trial court granted the store’s motion for no-evidence summary judgment and Heredia appealed. In connection with that appeal, “Heredia timely filed . . . an affidavit of
indigence in the trial court,” and “[n]o one filed a challenge . . . within the
following ten days.”181 However, one month after the date the affidavit
was filed, the court of appeals, acting sua sponte, signed an order, “purportedly ‘pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1(e),’ allowing any interested parties to file a challenge to Heredia’s affidavit in
the ten days following the date of that order.”182 Additionally, the court
of appeals “ordered that if a contest was ‘timely filed,’ the trial court
should conduct a hearing, prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and supplement the appellate record.”183 Three days after the court of
appeals’ order, a challenge to Heredia’s affidavit was filed by the court
reporter, who stated that the trial court had not notified her of the indigence affidavit as required by Rule 20.1 and that she was unaware of it
until she received the court of appeals’ order.184 Next, “the trial court set
a hearing to determine Heredia’s indigence.”185 Heredia moved to stay
that hearing and sought mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court observed that pursuant to Rule 20.1, “an affidavit of
indigence filed in a trial court is operative unless challenged within ten
days of its filing.”186 Further, the supreme court stated that although the
appellate rules “allow for suspension of a rule’s operation [for] ‘good
cause’ . . . lack of notice ‘in this context to a court reporter of the filing of
an affidavit of indigence is not good cause in light of Rule 20.1.’”187 The
supreme court conditionally granted Heredia’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the court of appeals to allow her “to proceed with her
appeal without payment of costs.”188
179. Id. The supreme court did not address or mention the existence of an adequate
remedy by appeal. However, the supreme court has previously concluded that no adequate
appellate remedy exists when a court acts without jurisdiction. See In re Dickason, 987
S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); see also In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co,
35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
180. 501 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
181. Id. at 70.
182. Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(e)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 71.
186. Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1).
187. Id. (quoting Morris v. Aguilar, 369 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam)). Additionally, the supreme court cited Rios v. Calhoon, 889 S.W.2d 257, 258–59 (Tex. 1994)
(per curiam) (orig. proceeding), a Rule 20.1 case that the supreme court described as “explaining that without a timely challenge ‘the party is absolutely entitled to the exemption
from costs, and the trial court lacks the authority to affect the party’s entitlement.’” Id.
188. Id. The supreme court did not address or mention the existence of an adequate
remedy by appeal. But see In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2016) (orig.
proceeding).
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V. TEXAS SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING
ADEQUATE REMEDY
The following chart distributes the cases described above into categories of (1) “specific discussion of adequacy of party’s appellate remedy”;
(2) “conclusory statement as to adequacy of appellate remedy”; (3) “adequacy of appellate remedy not addressed, but case(s) cited”; and (4) “adequacy of appellate remedy not addressed, no case cited.”
Table Two
Appellate Remedy
Treatment
Specific discussion of
adequacy of party’s
appellate remedy

Conclusory statement
as to adequacy of
appellate remedy

Opinion
In re Christus Santa
Rosa Health Sys., 492
S.W.3d 276 (Tex.
2016)
In re H.E.B. Grocery
Co., 492 S.W.3d 300
(Tex. 2016) (per
curiam)
In re J.B. Hunt
Transp., Inc., 492
S.W.3d 287 (Tex.
2016)
In re RSR Corp., 475
S.W.3d 775 (Tex.
2015)
In re M–I L.L.C., 505
S.W.3d 569 (Tex.
2016)

Adequacy of
appellate remedy not
addressed, but case(s)
cited

In re Keenan, 501
S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2016)
(per curiam)
In re Nat’l Lloyds
Ins. Co., 507 S.W.3d
219 (Tex. 2016) (per
curiam)
In re Bent, 487
S.W.3d 170 (Tex.
2016)
In re DePinho, 505
S.W.3d 621 (Tex.
2016) (per curiam)

Adequacy of
appellate remedy not
addressed, no case
cited

In re Nationwide Ins.
Co. of Am., 494
S.W.3d 708 (Tex.
2016)
In re Oceanografia,
S.A. de C.V., 494
S.W.3d 728 (Tex.
2016) (per curiam)
In re City of Dallas,
501 S.W.3d 71 (Tex.
2016) (per curiam)
In re Lazy W Dist.
No. 1, 493 S.W.3d
538 (Tex. 2016)
In re Heredia, 501
S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2016)
(per curiam)

Subject Matter of Case & Act Constituting
Abuse of Discretion

Mandamus
Disposition

Discovery: Trial court (t. ct.) did not
properly review allegedly privileged
documents before ordering production

Granted

Discovery: T. ct. improperly denied request
that plaintiff be required to submit to
medical examination

Granted

Dominant Jurisdiction: T. ct. improperly
denied plea in abatement because court
where suit was first filed had dominant
jurisdiction
Disqualification of Counsel: T. ct. abused
discretion by applying inapplicable analysis
under the law where party’s counsel
consulted with former finance manager of
opposing party
Disclosure of Trade Secrets: T. ct. did not
properly balance competing interests before
refusing to exclude party’s representative
from hearing involving trade secrets
Discovery: T. ct. improperly denied
homeowner’s request for production of
HOA ballots in lawsuit brought by HOA
Discovery: T. ct. improperly granted motion
to compel that was overbroad

Granted

Motion for New Trial: Ct. of app. properly
granted mandamus relief where t. ct.
abused discretion by granting new trial on
bases that were insufficient and/or not
supported by record
Pre-Suit Discovery: T. ct. abused discretion
by allowing pre-suit discovery because
former employee’s potential patent claim
was not yet ripe
Lawsuit Forum: T. ct. improperly refused
to enforce contractual forum selection
clause where no prejudice was shown
Lawsuit Forum: T. Ct. improperly denied
motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens because record did not support
t. ct.’s findings as to relevant factors
Discovery: County court at law improperly
authorized pre-suit discovery before
determining whether it had jurisdiction
Jurisdiction: Ct. of app. improperly granted
mandamus relief because t. ct. did not
abuse discretion by considering plea to
jurisdiction before appointing
commissioners in condemnation case
“Authority”: T. ct. lacked authority to
extend time to file affidavit of indigency as
to appeal

Granted

Granted

Granted
Granted

Denied

Granted

Granted

Granted

Granted
Granted

Granted
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As the chart illustrates, three of the fourteen cases described above
contained a specific discussion of the adequacy of a party’s appellate remedy; four contained a conclusory statement respecting such remedy; and
seven did not specifically address the adequate appellate remedy element. However, in five of the seven cases in which the adequate appellate
remedy element was not specifically addressed, the supreme court cited
cases with analogous fact situations in which it addressed whether an adequate appellate remedy existed. Further, as to the remaining two of those
seven cases, (1) one involved a conclusion by the supreme court that
there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court, thus making the existence of an adequate appellate remedy immaterial; and (2) the other involved the trial court’s lack of “authority” to act, which the supreme
court has concluded leaves a party without an adequate appellate
remedy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Texas Supreme Court’s mandamus opinions issued during this Survey period generally demonstrate an analytical method consistent with prior years, the supreme court’s treatment of the adequate
remedy by appeal element in In re J.B. Hunt Transport189 is not an insignificant development. That case shows that the supreme court remains
constant, not only in limiting the availability of mandamus as a remedy,
but also in maintaining a “heavily circumstantial” approach respecting
the existence of an adequate remedy by appeal.190 Thus, a focus on the
circumstantial posture of a case remains an important consideration when
pursuing mandamus relief in the supreme court.

189. See In re J.B. Hunt 492 S.W.3d at 298–300.
190. See In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding).

